

An Analysis of the Structure of Analysis

(The Gegenstand-relation in discussion)

door

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Summary

In this review we want to discuss the present state of epistemological perspectives within the tradition of reformational philosophy. In order to accomplish this, we have to get hold of the historical setting and background of the development of the insights of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven in this regard. Then we must look at the problems attached to the main epistemological distinctions they made and finally evaluate them systematically.

1. Introduction

Epistemological reflection was confronted with certain basic cosmological questions from its very inception. Perhaps the two most fundamental problems were those connected with the relationship between *universality* and *individuality* on the one hand, and those connected with *constancy* and *dynamics* on the other hand.

That these problems are intimately related to the first four modal aspects of reality, serving as points of entry to our theoretical reflection on created reality, is argued in another context.¹ It will be sufficient if we simply give a succinct indication of the way in which they functioned in epistemological questions.

2. Foundational modal concepts and ideas in epistemology

In the first issue of the newly founded periodical, *Reformational Forum*, I have tried to show that modal terms may be used in two distinct (though not separable) ways: (i) either to describe states of affairs displaying themselves within the limits (modal boundaries) of a specific aspect, or, (ii) they may be used to designate states of affairs which transcend the limits of the aspect in which the descriptive term has its original seat. The first option provides us with a *conceptual use* whereas the second one underlies an *idea-use* of such terms² To give only two examples: (i) We may use the numerical 'three' conceptually in arithmetic when we discuss the operation of addition within the system of natural numbers, or we may employ an idea-use of it in discussing the complexities surrounding the theological doctrine of God's trinity. (ii) We may refer to a *specific* (one) chair having four legs. Besides this conceptual use of numerical terms, we may reverse our approach and try to say something about the entire concrete existence of this chair, still by using numerical terms. In this case we may say that this chair is *unique*. Another idea-use of the meaning of number is given in the expression: 'this *individual* (particular) chair'. The *individuality* of this chair is not at all limited or restricted to its numerical modal function. On the contrary, when we speak about its *individuality* we are thinking about the *total existence* of this particular chair, displaying its *individuality* in all its facets. But at the same time we must uphold that our idea of its individuality cannot be formed without the foundational (constitutive) aid proved by the primitive meaning of number – only on the basis of our numerical intuition of a multiplicity of distinct entities are we able to speak about the *distinctness*, *uniqueness* and *individuality* of this chair. This *idea* of its *uniqueness* and *individuality* is nothing but a limiting and referring way in which the point of entry of the arithmetical aspect is used.

¹ Cf. my contribution to the Festschrift –*Wetenschap, Wijsheid, Filosoferen*– of Van Riessen: 'The modal aspects as points of entry to our experience of and reflection on reality', Assen 1981, 159-173.

² Cf. D.F.M. Strauss: 'Individuality and Universality', *Reformational Forum*, 1, (1983), pp. 25-28.

2.1. Background and implications of the substance concept

The modal meaning of the kinematic aspect underlies our notion of *constancy*. Although its first (still vague) natural scientific formulation was given by Galileo in his principle of *inertia*, the fundamental insight at stake is much older. In fact it was the kernel of Plato's epistemological concern. Plato was confronted with Heraclitus' problem of an ever-changing flow. Given the reality of continuous *change*, Plato realised that it will be impossible to account for *knowledge* at all, because every change is in need of some underlying *constant* element. Without the foundational meaning of kinematical persistence (constancy), every notion of physical change would be antinomic. And it is precisely this foundation which Plato abused metaphysically in his epistemology: the *outo to eidos* (essential form) cannot itself be changing if we are supposed to attain *knowledge* of anything. The genetic world of becoming cannot provide us with real knowledge – that is only to be found in the metaphysical realm of ideas. This opposition between *idea* and *appearance* gave birth to the time-honoured *substance* concept. Perhaps its most important effect in the area of epistemology was the speculative question whether we can know something 'essentially' or only as it 'appears'. It is common that Plato chose the 'essential' side and someone like Kant the 'appearance' side (according to him the 'Thing in itself' is unknowable).

The speculative substance concept determined the line along which the possibility of knowledge were accounted for – it was basically restricted to the sensory (psychic) and the logical (understanding) modes of our experience, although it was sometimes extended to include some form of intuition considered to be supra-emotional and supra-logical. Kant still adhered to this tradition with his starting-point in the isolation of sensibility (cf. B,33), strictly separated from our pure understanding (cf. B,89) in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR). [36]

2.2. The rationalistic tradition

The modal descent of the terms individuality and universality is essential for an understanding of the rationalistic legacy. Without our intuition of the nuclear meaning of number we won't be able to understand the distinctness or *individuality* of any entity. As such this notion represents therefore an idea-use of the modal meaning of number which transcends the limits of this aspect in its reference to the *uniqueness* of entities. The term universality, on the other hand, is only accessible on the basis of our understanding of the irreducible meaning of the spatial mode, because it refers to the spatial notion of *location* – whatever is considered to be universal is supposed to apply *everywhere*, i.e. universally. Its use is determined by the spatial time- order of simultaneity (at once). However, it seems that we here use the term universality in a conceptual sense, at least if we stick to the original modal meaning of space (continuous extension). When we approach the meaning of 'every' – in the sense of 'each one' or even 'all places' from the arithmetical mode, we cannot side-step the deepened numerical meaning of infinity, namely the idea of an infinity of instances present at once (the 'at once infinite' in distinction from the primitive numerical meaning of infinity: the 'successive infinite').³ In this case we are using the number-idea of the 'at once infinite' (traditionally known as the 'actual infinite').

The irreducibility of individuality and universality is therefore intimately connected with the irreducibility of the aspects of number and space, because these two modes fundamentally co-condition our reflection on the generality and particularity of entities.

2.3 Rationalism and Irrationalism reconsidered

Concept-formation is always bound up with the universal order for, and the universal orderliness of things. This implies, as we saw, that one cannot grasp the individual side of entities in a concept. Aristotle took this restriction to imply that the individuality of things is beyond the grasp of *knowledge*. Contrary to this view, we must recognize the fact that everybody has *knowledge* of things in their individuality, i.e. has knowledge of the individual side of things, even though this kind of knowledge is not conceptual. Much rather it is of a limiting and approaching nature, referring to the individual side of entities in terms of universal features. But this is simply another way to specify what 'idea-knowledge is all about – an idea concentrates a conceptual diversity upon (or refers it to) that which transcends the limits of all concept-

³ In an uncompleted study on the Philosophy of the Infinite these distinctions are developed in confrontation with foundational research in mathematics. Some of the results obtained in this uncompleted study are summarized in: 'Introduction to a Philosophy of the Infinite', *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, (3rd-4th Quarter, 1983), pp. 1-37.

formation.

The standard legacy on rationality and knowledge sticks to this restriction of (rational) knowledge to *conceptual knowledge*. This kind of approach is defined as *rationalistic*. Rationalism elevates the universal (or universality) as the only source of knowledge. Irrationalism, on the other hand, always wants to pay tribute to the contingent uniqueness of the individual side of things or events which, as we saw, transcends the limits of concept-formation. Irrationalism leaves no room for real conceptual knowledge. [37]

3. Kant, neo-Kantianism, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven

As we have mentioned, Kant started from the isolation of sensibility and understanding. This confronted him with an unsolvable problem, because it is impossible to bridge the gap between sensibility and understanding *after* the strict isolation and separation of both. Dooyeweerd's criticism of Kant in this respect is therefore completely to the point (cf. NC II, pp. 494 ff.).

In the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism the Kantian opposition between understanding and sensibility was again questioned. Following Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp stressed the uniting (and opposing) function of our understanding. The fundamental thesis, however, is that one cannot start from a *given* multiplicity which should be unified afterwards. In every original thought-act – as an act of determination – an X is determined both in its Unity and Multiplicity.⁴ This statement is supplemented with an explicit exploration of a possible synthesis between understanding and sensibility, ending with the positing of the *purely logical* nature of our understanding:

It is now not any longer possible to speak about a multiplicity of sensibility, which should synthetically be united by our thought in an act of knowledge performed only afterwards. How will it be possible for the multiplicity of our senses to be combined in the unity of a concept? In this case, the basic elements, unity and multiplicity, would not both have been thought-moments; consequently, also their combination would not have been performable within pure thought as such. Much rather, in order to achieve this synthetic unity, our understanding should first of all unite itself with something external to it, something foreign, "sensibility". Alternatively, there must be a third instance, transcending both sensibility and understanding, which can perform this synthesis. However, in reality this is not the case, since in one and the same thought-act multiplicity originates simultaneous with the consciousness of unity, as both thought-structured modes of determination which are in their thought-character strictly connected with each other' (p. 48).

Just as Kant, who proceeded from the isolation of sensibility and understanding, Natorp started in this approach from the abstraction of pure logicity *without* asking the question how this primordial act of identification and distinguishing (abstraction) as such is possible!

Dooyeweerd clearly saw this fundamental flaw in the prevalent functionalistic epistemology (NC II, p. 431). However, in his reaction against this heritage, he unfortunately took over one of the cornerstones of their approach: the idea of a synthesis of opposed elements. The alteration introduced by him, was to broaden the perspective in the light of his theory of the modal aspects. Instead of restricting himself to the logical mode, as Natorp did, or to the modes of sensibility and logicity, as Kant did, he extended the scope to include all the non-logical aspects which are supposed to be opposed to the logical function of our act of thought in the *Gegenstand*-relation. The third option raised by Natorp in his words quoted above, namely to look for something *transcending* the two opposed poles of sensibility and understanding, was indeed followed up by Dooyeweerd in his trans[38]cendental criticism where he claimed that 'tine theoretical synthesis is possible only from a supra-theoretical starting point' (NC I, p. 56, cf. p. 51 ff.).

Vollenhoven spoke in a similar fashion about the 'biunity' which constitutes the method of each special science, although it is always possible to distinguish the analytical from the field of investigation: 'One only has to think about words such as "bio-logist", "psycho-logist", "socio-logist" and so on, in which case the first part indicates the non-analytical and the second part the analytical'.⁵

4. Problems and inconsistencies related to the *Gegenstand*-relation

4.1. Reactions within reformational philosophy

4.1.1. Van Riessen's 'Wijsbegeerte'

In 1970 Van Riessen published his 'Wijsbegeerte' as a revised edition of his earlier 'Op Wijsgerige Wegen'.

⁴ Natorp: *Die logische Grundlagen der Exakten Wissenschaften*, 1921(2) p.47.

⁵ D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: 'Hoofdlijnen der Logica', *Phil. Ref.*, 13 (1948), p. 62, cf. p. 63.

In this new edition he mentioned the ambiguity in Dooyeweerd's conception of the Gegenstand-relation. On the one hand, (i) it is seen as the mental opposition of the logical and the non-logical, and on the other hand (ii) the Gegenstand is explained as standing over against the real logical function of the thought-act.⁶ Van Riessen did not provide further immanent criticism of Dooyeweerd's approach, but simply stated that the main objection is that one cannot, in the case of the alternative (i), imagine anything representing this relation (p. 118). Similarly, without any further argumentation, he stated that Dooyeweerd was influenced by Kant in connection with the notions of 'Gegenstand' and 'synthesis' (p. 118).

4.1.2. Mekkes, Van Niekerk, Strauss

In his last extensive work, *Radix, Tijd, Kennen*,⁷ Mekkes often referred to the Gegenstand-relation. His emphasis was constantly on the *thought-act* and the logical *subject-object relation*. He explicitly stated that the 'poles' of this abstract relation are *in concreto* only to be found in the *modal* logical subject-object relation which functions within the general structure of the theoretical thought-act.⁸ Later in this work he related the place of the Gegenstand-relation within the logical subject-object relation with the disclosure dimension, present in *all* subject-object relations (p. 199). It seems as if this view approximates Van Riessen's first interpretation of the Gegenstand-relation, while simultaneously transforming it into the deepened logical subject-object relation. He even once interchangeably used the expressions 'logical-analytical subject-object relation' and 'theoretical Gegenstand-relation'(p. 91). The other references to the Gegenstand-relation in this work do not elucidate his approach any further (cf. pp. 43, 50, 112, 117, 167, 183). [39]

In an article on the meaning-character of reality in *Philosophia Reformata* (Phil. Ref.),⁹ I included in passing a Remark on the Gegenstand-relation. At that stage I tried to overcome the inconsistent restriction of the Gegenstand-relation to the non-logical aspects by stating that one can oppose *any* aspect to the actual logical function of the concrete thought-act. To support my proposal, I called upon two places in NC where Dooyeweerd abolished the restriction of the Gegenstand to the non-logical aspects (cf. NC II, pp. 390, 471-472).

At this stage, the first student who enrolled for his M.A. degree in philosophy under my guidance was so fascinated by these epistemological problems, that he decided to tackle them in his proposed M.A. thesis.¹⁰ To my mind, the most important merit of this study is given in the way in which he explored the relationship between the Gegenstand-relation and the logical subject-object relation. He introduced a distinction between what he called the 'relation of isolation' (isoleringsrelasie) and the 'relation of analysis' (analiseringsrelasie). In an attempt to elucidate Dooyeweerd's view on analysis and synthesis, Van Niekerk actually introduced this distinction to indicate two relations functioning at the logical object-side of reality, correlated with the activities of abstraction and analysis at the subject-side.

In the 'relation of isolation' he still maintained the restriction *logical non-logical*. Only by means of the analogies in which the non-logical aspects anticipate or retrocipate to the logical aspect are we able, according to this approach, to 'isolate' the logical mode. However, he opened up a new avenue in combining the logical subject-object relation and the Gegenstand-relation in such a way that the latter was subsumed under the former. Regarding the notion of an inter-modal synthesis, it must be noted that he still thought that his view on analysis was an attempt to account for the tenability of the idea of an inter-modal

⁶ H. van Riessen: *Wijsbegeerte*, Kampen 1970, p.117.

⁷ Although J.P.A. Mekkes often referred to the Gegenstand-relation in his smaller work of 1973, 'Tijd der bezinning' (Amsterdam), he never explicitly analyzed the relationship between the Gegenstand-relation and the logical subject-object relation. Cf. pp. 32, 48, 82. The same applies to Mekkes' article 'Wet en Subject in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee', *Phil.Ref.* 27 (1962), cf. pp. 160, 176.

⁸ 'De "polen" van deze abstracte relatie zijn in concreto slechts aan te treffen in de binnen de theoretische denkakt (in ruime zin) fungerende modaal-logische subject-objectrelatie, ...' *Radix, Tijd, Kennen*, Amsterdam 1971, p. 45.

⁹ 'Herbesinning oar die sin-karakter van die werklikheid by H. Dooyeweerd', *Philosophia Reformata*, 36 (1971), pp. 58-59.

¹⁰ Cf. P.J. van Niekerk: *Die Struktuur van die Wetenskap in Wysgerige Perspektief*, unpublished M.A. thesis, Dept. of Philosophy, UOFS, Bloemfontein 1971.

meaning-synthesis, understood in the sense of Van Riessen (i).¹¹ The difference with Mekkes was that Van Niekerk gave a lucid and detailed account of the way in which logical objectification achieves an opposing relation between the different aspects.

In my dissertation¹² I have raised a number of points against the formulation of the Gegenstand-relation by Dooyeweerd. In summarizing them, I may mention the following points:

i) Dooyeweerd talks about an antithetical relation between the actual logical thought-function and its intentionally abstracted non-logical Gegenstand, and about an antithetical relation between a specific non-logical aspect x and the remaining non-logical aspects y (although in the latter case no inter-modal synthesis is possible).

ii) The restriction of the Gegenstand to the non-logical aspects is contradicted by statements in which Dooyeweerd explicitly speaks of the modal structure of the logical aspect itself as being a Gegenstand of our 'actual logical function' ('of theoretical analysis').¹³

iii) Relating to i) and as a consequence of ii) we must conclude that antithetical relation between the abstracted modal structure of the logical aspect and the abstracted non-logical aspects is also possible.

iv) (a) Is the theoretical concept of the modal structure of the logical aspect characterized as inter-modal or as intra-modal? If intra-modal, then the universal validity of the theory of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis is cancelled. Usually Dooyeweerd suggests that the logical law-sphere can only be theoretically analyzed by opposing it to all non-logical aspects of reality, i.e. by means of an inter-modal synthesis with all the non-logical aspects (cf. NC II, pp. 461-462). But then the same applies to all the non-logical aspects. The juridical aspect, for example, can then only be analyzed by opposing it to all the non-juridical aspects (including the logical one!) which are grasped in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. Consequently, the logical aspect cannot be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis, if and only if it can be analyzed in one! (b) The other possibility implicit in the conception of non-logical Gegenstand-aspects, is that *only* non-logical states of affairs are (theoretical-)logically analyzable, i.e. identifiable and distinguishable. For example, the judgment of identity: *legal is legal*, is only possible due to the non-logical nature of this juridical state of affairs. The immanent criticism applicable to this explanation is obvious: Simply consider the identity judgment: *logical is logical*. If all identification and distinction are always directed only to non-logical realities, it stands to reason that this identity judgment also pertains to non-logical states of affairs. Consequently, the identity judgment logical is logical is valid if and only if *logical is non-logical*.¹⁴

v) The sharp distinction which Dooyeweerd upholds the Gegenstand-relation and the logical subject-object relation is contradicted by himself where he states that the pre- and post-logical aspects of reality can be logically objectified (cf. NC, II, pp. 390, 472).

vi) The actual and inter-modal nature of the intuition cannot, as Dooyeweerd assumes, establish the inter-modal meaning – synthesis between the [41] actual logical, thought-function and the abstracted non-logical aspects for the simple reason that it cannot function actually in abstraction.

vii) The question: how is it possible to obtain an implicit knowledge of the modal aspects in our naive

¹¹ Cf. also his remark in a recent article: 'Die antitetiese denkrelassie (Gegenstandsrelasie) as kenmerkende strukturele relasie van die teoretiese denke in die wetenskapsbeskouing van H. Dooyeweerd', *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, 3rd-4th quarter 1982, p. 89. On p. 80 of this article Van Niekerk mentioned Dooyeweerd's account of an analysis of the modal structure of the logical aspect by pointing out that in this case the antithetical relation as an intermodal synthesis between the abstracted logical and the abstracted non-logical aspects [Van Riessen (ill is explicit).

¹² D.F.M. Strauss: *Begrip en Idee*, Assen 1973, cf. pp. 102 ff.

¹³ Respectively NC I, p. 40, footnote 1, and NC II, p. 463.

¹⁴ This implicit possibility actually came to the fore in a discussion which I had with Dooyeweerd and Hommes in 1973 (the evening of June, 14). On that occasion I discussed my problems with and criticism of the Gegenstand-relation with them on the basis of a 14 page succinct statement of my considerations. When I raised the problems connected to the 'Gegenstand-relation'-account of analyzing the logical mode itself, Hommes used the argument that our logical function is always directed towards non-logical states of affairs. He mentioned the example of the identity judgment *legal is legal* (*recht is recht*). My immediate reaction was to formulate the mentioned formal contradiction. Neither Dooyeweerd nor Hommes during the discussion succeeded in providing a tenable defense of the Gegenstand-relation against this method of immanent criticism. While Hommes was still trying to get out of the impasse Dooyeweerd frankly admitted to us that it may be that I have laid my finger on a problem not solved by his own theory.

pre-theoretical experience (by means of systatical logical objectification) *without* the need for an inter-modal synthesis, is not answered by Dooyeweerd.

viii) When the cosmic meaning-systasis is acknowledged, the first basic problem of a critical theory of knowledge is not given with the question as to the possibility of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis, but in the question: how is it possible to arrive at an analytical awareness of the modal and structural meaning-diversity in our non-theoretic experience?

As an alternative, the possibility of explaining the unity and multiplicity of a concept from the angle of the logical subject-object relation is investigated. On the basis of human cosmically-intuitive self-consciousness, it is possible (by means of systatical or distatical logical objectification) to arrive at conceptual knowledge of the cosmic meaning-diversity. Distatical logical objectification merely consists of making *explicit* the (systatically) *implied* meaning-diversity. Consequently, theoretical disjunctive thought is only possible within the logical subject-object relation. The subjective theoretical-logical activity of disjunction is always correlated with the objective logical relation of disjunction (the relation of abstraction and analysis introduced by Van Niekerk). Without any restriction to the opposition: logical – non-logical, any two aspects may be theoretically distinguished by means of an analogy (resp. meaning-nucleus) as the basis of comparison in the relation of abstraction within the distatical logical object-side (contra Van Niekerk's maintenance of Dooyeweerd's restricted in the relation of 'isolation'). Any abstracted modal aspect, then, can be investigated in the relation of analysis. Within the deepened logical subject-object relation, the theoretically distinguished modal aspects are (logically objectified) intermodally opposed to each other. The logical subject-object relation, however, is no antithetic relation (in need of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis – also rejecting the Van Niekerk modification of Dooyeweerd's notion of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis), and admits of no restriction of analysis to the non-logical aspects. Only by means of an explicit distatical logical objectification is it possible to obtain a theoretical concept of any modal aspect. And only our subjective distinguishing activity, correlated with that which is theoretically distinguished, is embedded in the inter-modal bottom-layer of our actual intuition.

Comparing this approach with the mentioned objections raised against Dooyeweerd's view of the Gegenstand-relation, the following is evident:

i) No ambiguity is any longer present in the notion of an antithetical relation: Within the disclosed logical subject-object relation the modal aspects are distinctly (i.e. logically objectified) opposed to each other. And it is *only* within this relation of disjunction at the logical object-side of reality that we meaningfully can speak of an antithetical relation in the mentioned meaning of an objective logical standing apart.

ii) No restriction to the non-logical aspects is any longer necessary.

iii) The implication of Dooyeweerd's formulations, namely that also the abstracted logical aspect may be antithetically opposed to the non-logical [42] aspect, may be accepted *on condition* that these abstractions are acknowledged as appearing at the distatical logical object-side.

iv) It is also no longer meaningful to ask for a synthesis between our actual logical thought-function and some abstracted non-logical Gegenstand. Furthermore, in the sense of our notion of logical objectification it is clear that two distatically objectified abstractions cannot be *synthesized* by our analytical activity. The term *synthesis* can only be used to indicate the way in which the multiplicity of analyzed structural features of a *specific* (i.e. one) aspect is conceptualized!

v) The important difference between the Gegenstand-relation and the logical subject-object relation is no longer necessary. The activity of disjunction and the relation of disjunction respectively function at the logical subject-side and object-side. Therefore, functioning *within* the logical subject-object relation they cannot be opposed to this logical subject-object relation.

vi) In terms of this perspective on the logical subject-object relation there is no need to claim that the intuition must function actively in any abstraction.

vii) Since the modal aspects are already implicitly logically objectified in our pre-theoretical thought, their theoretical abstraction and analysis are not in need of any inter-modal meaning-synthesis. The implied meaning-diversity is only made explicit by means of distatical logical objectification. viii) This approach confirms that the first basic problem of epistemology *is not* an account of *theoretical* knowledge, but an explanation of the possibility and limits of our everyday experience and knowledge of things and events. It is only on the basis of our integral everyday experience that we are able to articulate the acknowledged meaning-diversity scientifically. (That theoretical thought is characterized by modal analysis will be argued in par. 6.2.)

5. New developments

During the past ten years a number of scholars within the tradition of reformational philosophy devoted some attention to the epistemological problem – either directly or indirectly.

5.1. Dooyeweerd's reaction¹⁵

The most important defense of Dooyeweerd against my criticism and suggestion that we should use the opened up logical subject-object relation to account for the nature of theoretical thought, is given in his interpretation that I have launched my whole criticism in a *purely formal logical* way, emphasizing only logical contradictions. This method, so Dooyeweerd proceeds, differs in principle from his method of laying bare *antinomies* which are the result of the absolutization of specific modal aspects (PR 1975, pp. 96-97).

In addition to this understanding of my position, Dooyeweerd unfortunately neither systematically discussed the 'formal contradictions' which I raised, nor did he pay any attention to the implications for the formulation of the transcendental critique which I have suggested (for example, my question: how is it possible to 'oppose' the 'Gegenstand' to our logical function without having *knowledge* of the 'Gegenstand' at this stage?)

In order to get to the crux of his reaction, I have to explain the relationship between formal (logical) contradictions and antinomies (as it is indeed maintained in my dissertation!). What is also remarkable, is that Dooyeweerd completely side-stepped the quotation from Natorp's *Logische Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* given above. This quotation indeed demonstrates that Dooyeweerd's notion of an inter-modal synthesis in need of a supra-modal starting-point was indirectly suggested by Natorp.¹⁶

5.1.1 Contradiction and antinomy

Given the problems which I have formulated in connection with the restriction of the 'Gegenstand' to the non-logical aspects, I attempted to indicate the *origin* of this limitation. I claimed that it due to an after-effect of Kant's rationalism. Kant identified the thinking 'I' (the 'cogito') with the modal structure of the logical mode and opposed it (as formal logical lawgiver of nature) to the chaotic multiplicity of sensory impressions. Dooyeweerd, of course, never elevated actual human thought to the level of the universally valid law-giver (resp. form-giver) of (natural) reality. Nor did he identify our human self-hood with our logical function. However, in his formulation of the Gegenstand-relation, he indeed identified our *analytical subjectivity* with the *full modal structure* of the *logical aspect*. Consequently, in *theoretical* thought, there is no room left for the logical object-side! Whatever is *opposed* to our theoretical logical subjectivity must be *non-logical* in nature, be found *outside* the sphere of our subjective logical activity! I formulated it as follows: 'Dooyeweerd's sharp criticism of Kant's rationalistic view of the understanding as the universally valid logical legislator of nature ..., must be applied to himself in a modified way, i.e. with due observance of the fact that Dooyeweerd certainly does not elevate actual human thought to the rank of universally valid legislator ... of nature (reap. the cosmos).'¹⁷

Dooyeweerd quoted this section of my exposition, and added the following surprising and unfounded remark: 'This means in other words that my sharp criticism of Kant's conception of the subjective logical thought-function as formal legislator of nature is applicable to myself with this modification that it is

¹⁵ 'De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-objectrelatie', *Phil.Ref.*, 40 (1975), pp. 83-101 (subsequently quoted as: PR 1975); 'The Epistemological Gegenstand-Relation and the Logical Subject-object-Relation', *Phil.Ref.*, 41 (1976) pp.1-8 (subsequently quoted as: PR 1976).

¹⁶ That Dooyeweerd's acceptance of a supra-modal starting-point, residing in the religious dimension of reality, IS not unique, is clearly seen from the fact that also Alexander Varga van Kibed defended a similar solution. Von Kibed is strongly influenced by neo-Kantianism (the Baden-school) and especially by Nicolai Hartmann. The Kantian opposition of understanding and sensibility and the neo-Kantian opposition of value and reality (thought and being) influenced his formulation of the unbridgeable gulf between truth and reality. The principle of identity forbids the connection or unification of truth and reality *Einführung in die Erkenntnislehre* (1952), München 19793, p. 37). However, according to him this synthesis is possible in the 'metaphysical-religious sphere': 'The solution of the unsolvable problems, establishment of the lost unity of our being and our thought is only to be expected from this deepest layer'('Die Lösung der unlösbare Probleme, das Setzen der verlorenen Einheit unseres Seins und Denkens kann nur von dieser tiefsten Schicht erwartet werden', p. 38).

¹⁷ Cf. *Concept and Idea*, pp. 128-129.

not applicable to me!' (PR 1976, p.6, cf. PR 1975, p. 96). The *modification* did not cancel the criticism, but highlighted the differences between Dooyeweerd and Kant. The *similarity*, namely their shared *identification* of logical subjectivity with the full modal structure of the logical aspect, represents the crux of the matter. Dooyeweerd himself understood *rationalism* to mean that the (factual-) subject-side of reality is identified with its law-side (structural side).¹⁸ The two *sentences following* the given one quoted by Dooyeweerd, clearly explain this fully: 'This difference explains why Kant viewed the transcendental unity of our self-consciousness as a unity above all multiplicity, whereas Dooyeweerd maintained that the human self-hood transcends every aspect. At most it can be said that human logical subjectivity is identified with the modal structure of the logical aspect in an (implicitly) rationalistic fashion through the formulation of the antithetical relation' (*Concept and Idea*, p. 129). Instead of following my criticism in its footsteps, he was pleased with this *general* (but unfounded) defense that I did not use his method of antinomy. As a result, only some of my points were handled, leaving aside *some* of the most crucial ones [cf. point iv) (b) of paragraph 4.1.2.].

The distinction between contradiction and antinomy is therefore a good illustration of my suspicion. Just before I explained my problems with the Gegenstand-relation, I have mentioned the internal *antinomy* present in Kant's epistemology, given in the impossibility to re-unite the opposition between our understanding and sensibility from a supposedly purely logical thought-pole. In fact I did not only quote Dooyeweerd and Kroner in this regard, but also explicitly used the word 'antinomic!' 'R. Kroner and Dooyeweerd sharply recognized the antinomic isolation of self-consciousness in the logical pole of thought' (*Concept and Idea*, pp.95-96). *Given* this background, and given the confirmation of this very same criticism at the end of my exposition, it must be clear that my whole criticism was not at all merely meant in a purely formal logical sense. Every antinomy unavoidably implies formal logical contradictions. Therefore, contrary to Dooyeweerd's understanding of my criticism as purely formal logical in nature, I indeed used his own method of antinomies! It seems as if Dooyeweerd did not connect the section preceding my criticism on the Gegenstand-relation with the latter (which started only on page 101 95.) and with my concluding evaluation of the rationalistic element still present in his formulation of the Gegenstand-relation. Anyone acknowledging *the full context* of my exposition, cannot but acknowledge that I have tried nothing but to show that the underlying antinomy, caused by the mentioned rationalistic element, unavoidably implies various logical contradictions.¹⁹ [45]

5.1.2 Concept-formation and the meaning-diversity

Dooyeweerd pointed out that it is problematic to speak of an *implicit concept* of the modal aspects present in our non-scientific thought (PR 1975, pp. 91 ff.). The same objection was formulated by P.J. Van Niekerk²⁰ Due to this criticism I must concede that it is a bit far-fetched to uphold that we do have implicit concepts of the modal aspects in non-theoretical experience. Of course this does not cancel the presence of an *analytical awareness* of *modal properties* which are also experienced in our non-theoretic life, for otherwise our notions of *multiplicity* (the experience of a *number* of entities), *magnitude* (the experience of the size of entities), *expensiveness* (the experience of the price of entities), and so on, would have been impossible.²¹

¹⁸ Compare the article mentioned in footnote 2 above and my alternative approach mentioned in par. 2.3. above.

¹⁹ Although Dengerink was convinced (unjustly, as is seen from our counter-criticism) by Dooyeweerd's answer that I am guilty of employing only a formal-logical method of criticism ['Ontisch of len Intentioneel?', *Phil.Ref.*, (1977), p.131, he correctly pointed out that formal logical contradictions may be symptomatic of underlying antinomies (p.14). However, Dooyeweerd's defense of the Gegenstand-relation in connection with the abstracted nature of the analytical aspect, did not convince Dengerink of its tenability. Consequently, he stated that the supposedly (optically apriori) structure of theoretical thought (given in the Gegenstand-relation as inter-modal antithesis and synthesis) is no longer acceptable (p.25).

²⁰ 'Die antitetiese denkrelassie (Gegenstandsrelasie) as kenmerkende strukturele relasie van die teoretiese denke in die wetenskapsbeskouing van H Dooyeweerd', *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, (1982), p.88 ff.

²¹ The consideration that modal properties are typified in non-theoretic experience by structures of individuality (entitary structures) does not cancel their universality but only *specify* it. If it was possible to individualize universality, the distinction between universality and individuality would have been cancelled, as well as the irreducibility of number and space. Cf. the last paragraph of section 2.2 above,

I have used the example of the difference between the visit of friends and an official visit of the police to point at the difference between legal intercourse (a juridical figure with a social retrocipation) and social intercourse. Dooyeweerd was partly correct in his remark that, according to its social aspect, the only difference is one of typicality (PR 1976, pp. 4-5). However, my point concerned not only the social aspect, but the interrelation between the social and the juridical aspects, evident in the retrociprocity moment of legal intercourse. I still think it is tenable to acknowledge an analytical awareness of *analogical modal properties* in our non-theoretic experience. The following example may clarify this point much better. People seeing the President of a state and his body-guard next to each other (their actual *spatial distance*) will never conclude that they belong to the same social rank. They will be firmly aware of the fact that there is a large *social distance* between the two persons, in spite of their spatial proximity.

This awareness of the difference between *spatial distance* and *social distance* surely pertains to *modal properties* observable in the concrete event of the being together of the President and his body-guard.²²

The contradictory implications of the underlying rationalistic antinomy in Dooyeweerd's epistemology were most evident in the impossibility to account for an analysis of the logical modal aspect in terms of an inter-modal opposition and synthesis. One therefore might have expected from Dooyeweerd to consider my arguments in detail. The astonishing fact is, however, that he completely side-stepped my arguments!

In par. 4.1.2. iv) (b) I have raised the problem in the following way:

The other possibility implicit in the conception of non-logical Gegen[46]stand-aspects, is that *only* non-logical states of affairs are logically analyzable, i.e. identifiable and distinguishable. For example, the judgment of identity: *legal is legal*, is only possible due to the non-logical nature of this juridical state of affairs. The immanent criticism applicable to this explanation is obvious: Simply consider the identity judgment: *logical is logical*. If all identification and distinction are always directed only to non-logical realities, it stands to reason that *this* identity judgment also pertains to *non-logical* states of affairs. Consequently, the identity judgment: *logical is logical* is valid if and only if *logical is non-logical*.

Dooyeweerd did not say a word about this argument in his reaction. The other form of the same impasse was mentioned above in the following form:

'To the theoretical concept of the modal structure of the logical aspect characterized as inter-modal or as intra-modal? If intra-modal, then the universal validity of the theory of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis is cancelled. Usually Dooyeweerd suggests that the logical law-sphere can only be theoretically analyzed by opposing it to all non-logical aspects of reality, i.e. by means of an inter-modal synthesis with all the non-logical aspects. But then the same applies to all the non-logical aspects. The juridical aspect, for example, can then only be analyzed by opposing it to all the non-juridical aspects (including the logical one!) which are grasped in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. Consequently, the logical aspect cannot be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis, if and only if it can be analyzed in one.'

Dooyeweerd quoted this argument fully in his answer (cf. *Concept and Idea*, pp. 105-106, and PR 1975, pp. 99-100, cf. PR 1976, p.7). However, without trying to counter the explicitly stated logical contradiction, he repined by stating that what I identified as an 'untenable circle' simply was a consequence of the transcendental ground-Ideas concerning the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects – a ground-Idea also accepted by myself (PR 1975, p.100). This remark is completely besides the point. What is at stake is *not* the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects, but the contradictory implications of his antinomic conception of the Gegenstand-relation! I indeed accept the idea of the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects – but no one has (to my knowledge) been able to formulate any similar contradiction with an appeal merely to this ground-Idea! What is furthermore perplexing to me, is that Dooyeweerd seemingly is not bothered by the implied logical contradictions. I am so much indebted to his philosophical approach, that I can hardly believe that he here did justice to himself.

5.1.3. Inconsistencies in Dooyeweerd's epistemology

In my discussion of Dooyeweerd's unsatisfactory reaction one last point should be raised. It concerns the fact that although I have explicitly developed the consequences of *some* of his own view-points in my

where we stated: 'The irreducibility of individuality and universality is therefore intimately connected with the irreducibility of the aspects of number and space, because these two modes fundamentally condition our reflection on the generality and particularity of entities.'

²² This *analytical awareness* cannot be divorced from conceptual elements, although it is not imperative that one should also accept the presence of clear-cut *modal* concepts in our non-theoretic experience.

account of the opened-up structure of the logical subject-object relation, which of course are in contradiction with Dooyeweerd's main emphasis on the Gegenstand-relation (in the sense of an opposition between the actual logical function of our real act of thought and some or other non-logical aspect as [47] Gegenstand), he neither referred to this state of affairs in his answer, nor did acknowledge any contradiction in his formulations.²³

It will suffice to mention only two of his crucial statements: (i) 'The prelogical aspects become logically *thinkable* only in logical objectivity.... The pre-logical aspects must primarily be objectified by logical thought, Be., the logical object-side of reality must be made *patent, manifest*, if we are to attain knowledge of these aspects' (NC II, p.390); (ii) 'At the same time the logical object-side of reality is deepened in the subject-object relation. It changes from an objective logical systasis, merely embedded in temporal reality, into an objective logical "standing apart", the objective dis-stasis of a functional multiplicity in the analytical aspect.... Only now are those aspects which precede the logical law-sphere *distinctly* objectified in the latter' (NC II, pp.471-472). The first statement is aimed at our non-theoretic experience and the second one accounts for theoretic knowledge. There can be no argument that Dooyeweerd is here concerned with the (opened-up) logical subject-object relation in connection with *logically objectified modal aspects!* They are in flat contradiction with his reaction *and* with his generally accepted notion of the Gegenstand-relation, even though he did not seem willing to acknowledge this fact.

If someone wants to answer my objections properly, he must be willing to start with immanent criticism (as I tried to do) and then provide a formulation and exposition which is free from the discovered inconsistencies in my account. Although I did so in my criticism of Dooyeweerd (cf. *Concept and Idea*, pp.111-112 and pp. 124-126), nothing similar was done with respect to my approach (neither by Dooyeweerd, nor by Dengerink).²⁴

In my exposition of the way in which the notion of distatic logical objectification is free from logical contradictions, I explained, amongst other things, that distatic logical objectification amounts to an objective logical 'standing apart' (to use Dooyeweerd's own words). The identification of a specific aspect is no longer to be seen as an inter-modal synthesis between *two* aspects. Consider the formulation of our comparison above [par. 4.1.2 point iv]):

It is also no longer meaningful to ask for a synthesis between our actual logical thought-function and some abstracted non-logical Gegenstand. Furthermore, in the sense of our notion of logical objectification it is clear that two distatically objectified abstractions cannot be *synthesized* by our analytical activity. The term *synthesis* can only be used to indicate the way in which the multiplicity of analyzed structural features of a *specific* (i.e. *one*) aspect is conceptualized!

Dooyeweerd accused me in this connection of being guilty of *true antinomies*:

In order to maintain both the mutual irreducibility of the theoretically abstracted modal aspects and the supposed intra-modal logical character of the epistemological antithesis he is now obliged to assume that also their Irreducible meaning-kernels function in an intra-modal logical [48] sense without an inter-modal synthesis of our analytical activity with the non-logical modes of our experience. This would be tantamount to a complete destruction of the material contents of the epistemological concept and its dissolution into empty logical relations. From this indeed logicist view of the concept there arises an authentic antinomy between the modal law-sphere of the logical aspect and those of the other aspects *whose meaning-kernels cannot be interpreted in an intra-modal logical sense without canceling their irreducibility!* (PR 1976, p.8, cf. PR 1975, p.100).

I have nowhere attempted to 'interpret' the meaning-kernels of the aspects 'in an intra-modal logical sense'. In fact, it was Van Riessen who formulated exactly the same criticism in reaction to Dooyeweerd's notion of an intermodal synthesis: 'What can be the meaning of the synthesis? If the result is again logical in nature, the question arises whether it is not misplaced to view the road to that destination as one of synthesis? Is the synthesis logical in nature in the sense of deepened analysis, distinguishing? If so, are we not then confronted with an internal antinomy? If not, how is it possible that the result of this synthesis is logical in nature?' (Wijsbegeerte, p. 119). On pages 116-117 (cf. pp. 121-122) of my dissertation I have

²³ His final reaction was therefore much less open than his original response during the Conversation in June 1973 (mentioned above).

²⁴ It should be mentioned that P.J. Van Niekerk did take notice of the detail of my criticism – which in fact is dependent on his own distinction between the relation of 'isolation' and that of analysis.

stressed the fact that logical objectification cannot be accounted for in intra-modal logical terms, because it is fully dependent on the more-than-logical cosmic meaning-diversity. The act of logical objectification *pre-supposes* the *original* (not yet logically objectified) nature of whatever is logically objectified! Therefore, there cannot be any grounds for the criticism that logical objectification must necessarily contradict the mutual irreducibility of the meaning-kernels of the modal aspects. This irreducibility is the very condition of all *objectification!* I am afraid that also this defense of Dooyeweerd, which tried to escape from my criticism by accusing me of antinomies, was not successful.

5.2 Van Niekerk

Van Niekerk's mentioned article: 'Die antitetiese denkrelassie (Gegenstandsrelasie) as kenmerkende strakturele relasie van die teoretiese denke in die wetenskapsbeskouing van H. Dooyeweerd',²⁵ was perhaps written before Dengerink's mentioned article of 1977 (cf. his remark on p.52). As such, this 1982-article gives an excellent and detailed review of the different aspects of Dooyeweerd's epistemology, of the problems involved in it and the reactions caused by it. As we have mentioned, Van Niekerk here criticized my view on the relationship between non-theoretic experience and theoretical thought. He accepted my proposal to abolish the 'non-logical'-restriction in the relation of abstraction (cf. pp.87-88), but still questioned my rejection of the notion of an inter-modal synthesis. He thought that I rejected this notion of an inter-modal synthesis exclusively on the grounds that since in our non-theoretic experience the aspects are supposed to be logically objectified without the aid of an inter-modal synthesis, it is not necessary to introduce it for theoretical thought (cf. his remarks on p.89). He also remarked that I bypassed his intention to give an account of the nature of an inter-modal synthesis. However, it seems to me that he did not realize that I explicitly rejected this notion of an inter-modal synthesis (cf. *Concept and Idea*, pp.125-126). The only meaning of synthesis which I considered to be useful is that of the conceptualization of the multiplicity of structural moments of a specific theoretically analyzed modal aspect. Furthermore, the notion of implicit modal concepts in our non-theoretic experience (not any longer supported by me), was not the only ground for my rejection of the Idea of an inter-modal synthesis. I shall return to this point in the following section.

5.3 Dengerink

In his mentioned 1977-article on the relation between 'optic' and 'intentional', Dengerink considered the formulation of the Gegenstand-relation by Dooyeweerd untenable. As an alternative he gave an analysis of the scientific thought-activity in its multidimensional antic relation to the field of investigation and the results of scientific thought (PR 1977, pp. 35 ff.). While fully acknowledging the analytical *qualification* (contra Van Riessen) of scientific thought, he wanted to emphasize the fact that scientific activities should be analyzed in their functioning within all aspects of reality. He wanted to side-step my 'one-sided logical interpretation of the theoretical "Gegenstand-relation"' (p.36). In spite of his rejection of Dooyeweerd's account of the Gegenstand-relation, he still used the expression: Gegenstand-relation; He said that the theoretical attitude is typified by its 'opposing character (tegenoverstellend karakter) and as such bound to the 'Gegenstand-relation' (p.42). On the next page, however, we read that the theoretical Gegenstand-relation" may be interpreted as a logical subject-object relation – thereby coming close to my alternative. The difference with my approach is stated as follows: 'Although the theoretical "Gegenstand-relation" is logically qualified, it functions as such not exclusively in the logical-analytical mode, but in all modal aspects of reality' (p.43).²⁶

I must confess that I do not really grasp what his intention in this respect could be. Does he mean that the *logical subject-object relation* (which may function as an interpretation of the theoretical Gegenstand-relation) actually functions in all modal aspects? If we 'interpret' the 'Gegenstand-relation' as a *logical subject-object relation*, we cannot at the same time say that it is *more than* the logical subject-object relation (in that it functions in all modal aspects of reality)! If Dengerink wanted to say that the theoretical *thought-act* is more than its logical function, there is no problem. Nowhere in *Concept and Idea* did I contradict this integral view. Exactly what is 'onesided logical' in my notion of the deepened logical

²⁵ Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap, 3rd and 4th quarter, 1982.

²⁶ I have the same problem with Dengerink's reference to the 'abstracted field of research' which exists with its own foundation and qualification and which functions in 'all (I am emphasizing – DS) modal aspects of reality' (PR 1977, p.39).

subject-object relation is not clear. It seems as if Dengerink in this respect simply accepted Dooyeweerd's claim that I am guilty of a formal-logical method with logicistic undertones, without critically testing this thesis himself.

5.4. Van Eikema Hommes

In his important work on the complex basic concepts of jurisprudence Van Edema Hommes mentioned the ambiguity present in Dooyeweerd's account of object-functions. For example, Dooyeweerd stated: 'To which of [50] the modal aspects of reality is logical objectivity related in the cosmic meaning-coherence? In the first place to those aspects that serve as the substratum for the logical modus and whose *objective analogies* (I am emphasizing – DS) must be found in the logical object-side of reality. The pre-logical aspects become logically *thinkable* only in logical objectivity' (NC II, p.390). However, on the same page Dooyeweerd spoke about the logical objectification of the pre-logical aspects themselves: 'The pre-logical aspects of reality must primarily be objectified by theoretical thought'.

Van Eikema Hommes concluded from this ambiguity that we must distinguish strictly between modal retrocipations which are logically objectified, and the modal aspect towards which the retrocipatory analogy concerned referred back.

²⁷ According to him a confusion of the two possibilities can lead to 'serious misunderstandings', as is evident from my attempt to 'reduce' the 'scientific "Gegenstand-relation"' to the (disclosed) theoretical-logical subject-object relation' (p. 113).

A very subtle shift took place in Van Eikema Hommes' account. He identified 'the modal retrocipation, which is objectified' with the 'modal object-function (it)self' (p.112). In the quotations from Dooyeweerd presented by him, Dooyeweerd only spoke about 'objective analogies' (cf. NC II, pp. 374, 390), but nowhere equated the *objectification* of retrocipations with the object-side itself. The identification of the objectification of retrocipations in an aspect with the object-side of the aspect itself is tantamount to the denial of the structural givenness of the object-side of the post-numerical modal aspects. Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal structure of an aspect started from the assumption that we have to distinguish different structural moments within each aspect. First of all we must distinguish between the law-side (with its modal time-order) and the factual side (with its factual time-duration). Then we must distinguish between retrocipatory and anticipatory analogies (*both at the law-side and the factual side* – cf. NC II, p.75), qualified by the irreducible meaning-kernel of the aspect concerned. Finally, as the correlate of the law-side, we must distinguish between *the factual subject-side* and *the factual object-side*. Also in this case we have to *differentiate* the analogies at the factual side by distinguishing between *subjective* and *objective analogies*. Objectification is only possible on the basis of the *give* modal subject-object relation present in all the post-numerical modes. Consequently, the object-side of no aspect can *originate* in the act of objectification! The objectification of modal retrocipations cannot be the cause of the modal object-function, simply because the *structural givenness* of the object-side of all the post-numerical aspects is the transcendental condition of all possible objectification!

But even if we accept that the structural correlation of the factual subject- object relation is the transcendental condition for objectification in any post-arithmetical aspect, it still seems possible to uphold Van Eikema Hommes' contention by saying that it is only *modal analogies* that can be objectified. The implicit problem then is two-fold: (i) the original meaning of Dooyeweerd's expression 'objective analogies' becomes problematical, and (ii) knowledge of *original* modal properties in non-theoretic experience cannot be accounted for. [51]

(i) If the object-side of an aspect is structurally *given* (even when it is not yet made *patent*), then its *objective analogies* cannot be obtained through an objectification of its *subjective analogies*. It amounts to the same absurdity as saying that the subject-side of an aspect is identical to the 'subjectification' of its 'objective analogies'! In both cases the original subject-object *correlation* is cancelled.

(ii) When one asks a child *how many* friends he has, what the *time is*, or how *old* he is, one is referring to entities functioning subjectively within the modal structure of the *numerical* aspect, the *physical* aspect and the *biological aspect*. In other words, it concerns *original modal subject-functions* and *not* the *analogies* of these aspects in the logical mode. The child answering these questions by respectively saying 'eleven friends', 'five o'clock' and ten years' most certainly has *conceptual knowledge* of these *specified universal modal properties*.

²⁷ *De Samengestelde Grondbegrippen der Rechtswerenschap*, Zwolle 1976, p. 112, cf. p.113.

²⁸ In terms of Van Eikema Hommes' and Dooyeweerd's notion of the Gegenstand-relation *this* kind of knowledge must be impossible, because they are not willing to accept an inter-modal synthesis in our non-theoretic experience.

Although it is understandable that Van Eikema Hommes did not start an extensive epistemological discussion while presenting his analysis of the complex basic concepts of jurisprudence, it is a pity that he also did not try to answer the immanent criticism brought out by me on Dooyeweerd's formulation of the Gegenstand-relation. Instead of acknowledging contradictions in Dooyeweerd's account (to my mind an outcome of his implicit and antinomic rationalistic identification of logical subjectivity with the full modal structure of the analytical aspect), Van Eikema Hommes only spoke about the fact that Dooyeweerd's conception is *not clear* ('onhelderheid in Dooyeweerd's opvatting terzake') (p.112).

6. New perspectives

In order to assess my present evaluation, I want to give a succinct statement of what an analysis of the *structure of analysis* amounts to. This is crucial for an understanding both of non-theoretic and theoretic knowledge.

6.1 What is analysis?

As a first approximation we may look at the following statement:

'Analysis is first of all the successive distinguishing of universal features which are identified.'

One way of explaining what this statement is all about, is to point at the fundamental role of *identification*. Although every analytical act of identification is more complex than the numerical retrocipation within the structure of the logical aspect, it certainly cannot be explained without taking this retrociprocity numerical analogy into account. The original *dis[52]creteness* of the meaning of number co-determines the possibility to discern *differences* between entities and properties. Only on the basis of similarities, however, it is possible to see differences, and vice versa. When we consider the analogical meaning of the spatial time-order of simultaneity, analysis is concerned with the *simultaneous* juxtapositioning of universal features which are successively identified and distinguished. In this more 'precised' sense we may say that the two legs of analysis, namely *identification* and *distinguishing* imply each other.

The coherence with the numerical and spatial analogies underlies the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle. The *distinctness* of anything (or: feature) *identified* (the basis of the principle of identity)²⁹ implies that we must *distinguish* it (the basis of the principle of non-contradiction) from everything else. When the *successive* multiplicity (which lies at the basis) of analyzed moments (i.e. features distinguished and identified), is considered to be an infinite *totality* (present all at once – cf. footnote 3 above), *then* we may introduce the principle of the excluded middle in its universal applicability. The whole-part relation is an original spatial relation and its functions, under the guidance of our theoretical thought, as the basis of the introduction of the idea of the 'et once infinite'.³⁰ In the series of natural numbers one can identify every natural number and distinguish it from every other one. Only when we connect this mode of expression with the totality of natural numbers which are conjectured to be present at once (representing an anticipation of the numerical time-order of succession to the spatial time-order of simultaneity),³¹ are we in a position to give a foundation to the principle of the excluded middle: at the law-

²⁸ Note that I am not defending the thesis that the child does have a concept of the modal structure of these aspects as such. I am only referring to certain original modal features *in their typical entitary* specification. This qualification does not detract anything from their *modal* nature, however specified they may be in typical contexts. Specification does not change modal properties into entitles.

²⁹ Compare, in connection with this notion of distinctness, my remarks on an idea-use of numerical terms in par. 2.2. above. I have argued that the terms *distinctness* and *individuality* are *idea-usages* of numerical intuitions. The implication is that since our analysis starts with an awareness of *distinctness*, we must say that even everyday analysis is regulatively founded on idea-knowledge. In passing I want to mention that one must not confuse the meaning of distinct and distinguished in the Afrikaans text of my dissertation. 'Onderskeie hoeveelheid' = '*discrete* quantity', which is different from: '*distinguished* quantity'.

³⁰ Cf. section 2.2. and footnote 3 above.

³¹ Any finite set also represents an anticipation to the spatial time-order of simultaneity although this anticipation is given at the factual side of the numerical aspect. This explains why intuitionism accepts a

side of the analytical aspect it concerns a retrocipation to the numerical anticipation to space.

At this point we must mention the fact that the normal meaning of abstraction coincide with our notion of analysis. To analyze something always implies an act of lifting out, i.e. the identification of something or some property of it by disregarding or distinguishing it from non-relevant things or features. From this it must be clear that scientific knowledge cannot be characterized by abstraction alone, since as such abstraction occurs frequently in our non-theoretic everyday life. Only the qualification modal abstraction (analysis) seems fit for this demarcation. If one realizes that the modal aspects indeed function as points of entry to our experience of and reflection on everything in created reality (the modal aspects themselves [53] included!),³² then there cannot be any serious objection to this notion of theoretical thought.³³

6.2 Logical objectification

What then is logical objectification? It is nothing but the result of an act of identification and distinguishing (i.e. an act of abstraction or analysis)! And whatever is identifiable and distinguishable is logically objectifiable! This explains why the perspective of the disclosed logical subject-object relation does not need any restriction to the non-logical *aspects*: we can identify the logical modality and distinguish it from other modalities. We perform this act of theoretical modal analysis by stating what the meaning-kernel of the logical aspect is and by analyzing its inter-modal coherence with other modal aspects, as it comes to the fore in the different modal analogies within the structure of the logical aspect.

The way in which Stafleu introduces his notion of theories as logically qualified (historically disclosed) artefacts, indeed deserves serious consideration.

³⁴ The meaning of modal universality enables our logical thinking to master the multiplicity of entities in our daily experience in a systematic way. Therefore, the explicit identification and distinguishing of modal aspects represent an anticipatory meaning-moment within the structure of the logical aspect – it results in a deepened (disclosed) mastery of the modal aspects not only as universal modes of explanation but also as universal modes of unification. For this reason, the truly distinctive feature of theoretical thought, namely modal analysis (abstraction), mediating also every theoretical analysis of the typical structure of diverse entities, must be seen as an expression of the disclosed nature of theoretical thought. This view accounts for the equivalence of modal analysis and the opened-up character of theoretical thought.³⁵ Unfortunately Stafleu did not account specifically for the relationship between the logical subject-object relation and the Gegenstand-relation.

Even that which transcends our ability of logical objectification can only be approached in limiting concepts (ideas) which use logically objectified terms referentially. Every act of logical objectification presupposes the irreducibility of the different modal aspects. In other words, the logically objectified meaning of, let us say the numerical or biotical aspects, is to be distinguished both from the numerical and biotical analogies within the structure of the logical aspect (present both at the factual subject-side and the factual object-side), and from the original (not yet objectified) meaning of these aspects (contra Van Eikema Hommes). I simply cannot see why the identifiability and distinguishability (synonymous with my notion of logi[54]cal objectifiability) imply an eradication of the irreducibility of the modal aspects. That it confirms the inter-modal *coherence* between the different modal aspects seems much rather to be the case, because analysis (as identification and distinguishing) is completely dependent on the more-than-logical *cosmic meaning-diversity*!

specified applicability of the principle of the excluded middle in the finite case, whereas it rejects its applicability in the infinite case. Cf. Fraenkel, A., Bar-Hillel, Y., Levy, A., & Van Dalen, D.: Foundations of Set Theory, 2nd revised edition, 1973, Amsterdam, pp. 227 ff.

³² Dengerink questioned the notion of inter-modal opposition and synthesis also from this angle. He mentioned Dooyeweerd's reference to 'structural "Gegenstände"' and claimed that we cannot, with these distinctions, account for the nature of philosophy, which is directed towards the 'totality' of reality (PR 1977, p.26). Note that he had to use the modal term 'totality' to formulate his objection! Our integral non-scientific experience of things and events forms the basis of our theoretically disclosed modal analysis.

³³ Cf. my contribution to Van Riessen's 'Festschrift': *Wetenschap, Wijsheid, Filosoferen*, Assen 1981, pp. 159-173.

³⁴ Cf. M.D. Stafleu: 'Theories as logically qualified artifacts (I)', *Phil.Ref.*, (1981) nr.2, pp.164 ff.

³⁵ Cf. the remark of Stafleu in his article mentioned in the previous footnote, p.167.

6.3 The opposition of analysis and synthesis

This opposition is well-known since its introduction by Kant. After the Pythagorean crisis in arithmeticistic Greek mathematics, the fundamental geometrization of mathematics resulted in the subsequent use of spatial notions, even to characterize physical entities. Descartes still continued this legacy in his claim that 'the nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, colour, and the like, but in extension alone' (Principles, Part II, IV). In spite of obvious differences, there are striking similarities between this view of Descartes and the exposition given by Kant in the Transcendental Aesthetic:

'If, then, I take away from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks with regard to it, substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, colour etc., something still remains over from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and figure' (CPR, B, 35, cf. B,5-6). This explains why Kant considered the judgment: 'All bodies are extended' (B,11) to be analytic, whereas the judgment: 'All bodies are heavy' is seen as synthetic (B, 11). But if the characteristic weight (mass) is not analytically implied in the concept of a physical body, it is, logically viewed, contradictory to predicate weight in a so-called empirical-synthetic sense of the physical body.

What is traditionally called synthesis, must be seen in connection with the one leg of analysis, viz. *identification*: The act of identification is the conceptual combination (uniting, bringing *together*) of all the essential characteristics of that which is identified.³⁶ It shows that this act of concept-formation simply is an act of *synthesis*. At the same time it illustrates that the Kantian opposition of analysis and synthesis (still followed by Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven), is untenable. *Synthesis* is not the *opposite* of *analysis*, but merely the opposite of the other 'leg' of analysis, i.e. distinguishing!

From a different angle we have now shown that the transcendental criticism of Dooyeweerd still upheld this false opposition, since it started with the notion of analytical opposition (the first problem) and then proceeded to the idea of an inter-modal synthesis (albeit from the perspective of a supra-modal starting-point).³⁷ [55]

7. Concluding remarks

At this stage of our exposition we may return to a previous remark. We stated that Kant and Natorp simply proceeded from the isolation of sensibility and understanding without asking the question how this primordial act of identification and distinguishing (abstraction) as such is possible (cf. section 3 above). Our answer is simple: it is only possible on the basis of our integral cosmic awareness of the systematically cohering meaning-diversity which underlies the possibility of logical objectification.

Since all logical objectification pre-supposes a more-than-logical *diversity*, theoretical thought cannot but operate on the explicit or implicit basis of some theoretical total-view on this diversity (Dooyeweerd spoke of the ground-Idea, whereas contemporary theory of science, in a somewhat related fashion, sometimes speak of theoretical constructs or 'paradigms').

It is impossible to identify anything in the sense of an absolute unity (without any relation to multiplicity). Even when we have to identify a specific modal aspect, this act of identification can only be performed due to the fact that we must *distinguish* the identified aspect from other aspects (this explains why all monistic isms finally end up in an enormous, meaningless tautology).³⁸ At the same time it accounts for the necessity of intermodal relations which always confront theoretical analysis, revealing the need for an inter-modal criterion of truth (the principle of the excluded antinomy). Furthermore, the necessary philosophical foundation of the special sciences is also accounted for. To think scientifically one has to consider at least two different aspects, while every special science is in principle restricted to the

³⁶ Cf. Ernst Cassirer's observation that the determination of a concept as a 'unity in multiplicity' belongs to the classical legacy of logic and philosophy as such: *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, Vol. III, Berlin 1929, p.339.

³⁷ Just consider Dooyeweerd's formulation of his second transcendental problem: 'From what standpoint can we reunite synthetically the logical and the non-logical aspects of experience which were set apart in opposition to each other in the theoretical antithesis?' (NC I, p.45). The first problem concerned the question what was *abstracted* in the anthetic attitude and 'how is this *abstraction* (the emphasis is mine – DS) possible?' (NC I, p.41). *Abstraction* and *synthesis* are opposed to each other.

³⁸ Statements like: 'life is life' or 'justice is justice' are meaningful tautologies – their meaning is expressed in their indissoluble coherence with all the other irreducible modes of reality.

modal perspective of one modal aspect.

It still seems to me that, acknowledging the alterations and innovations which I have proposed in this article, the idea of the deepened logical subject-object relation can safe-guard us from the logical contradictions implied in the underlying antinomic rationalistic element in Dooyeweerd's formulation of the Gegenstand-relation. And I am not at all convinced that this approach is in any sense logicistic, since no one who accused me of this *ism* indeed showed that I tried to reduce any non-logical aspect to the logical one. Nor did anyone show that the notion of the deepened logical subject-object relation is antinomic, not to speak about the absence of any attempt to formulate the implied logical contradictions enclosed in this supposedly antinomic conception. When this is done, I shall be the first to abolish the idea of characterizing theoretical thought in terms of distatically disclosed logical objectification. [56]